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TRIBUTES
KENT GREENAWALT: AN APPRECIATION
Barbara Aronstein Black*
There are some tasks that present themselves as, at the same time,
an opportunity and a challenge. Crafting a brief tribute to Kent
Greenawalt is just such a task. It is first-and I should say foremost-an
opportunity to express in a public forum one's high regard for an es-
teemed colleague and valued friend, and, then, it is a challenge to dojus-
tice to his extraordinary accomplishments, to the man, and to his work.
In dedicating this issue to Kent, the Columbia Law Review honors one
of its own, whose association with Columbia Law School and the Review
goes back over half a century-a most appropriate reciprocation of the
honor that Kent himself, by his devotion to the highest academic
standards of teaching and scholarship, has brought to both of these
institutions.
Most Columbia Law School graduates of the era in which Kent was a
student have great regard for the education they received at this school.
And they have great regard for the men who taught them: They believe
that (cliche or not) there were giants in those days. And (cliches usually
being well-founded) as these things are measured, so there
were-perhaps chief among them, Kent's mentor, eventual colleague,
and friend, Herbert Wechsler.
Of course Kent's honoring of his mentor Herb Wechsler took a very
concrete turn with the 1978 publication, in an earlier tribute issue of this
law review, of the article titled The Enduring Significance of Neutral
Principles, his analysis of the famous-or notorious-Wechsler Holmes
Lecture.' At the publication of Wechsler's work, there was a great flutter-
ing of the dovecotes in the legal academy, and a number of law school
luminaries hurried into print to protest what they took to be the prob-
lematic nature of Wechsler's thesis. Kent's 1978 article is then, as its title
suggests, in the nature of a rejoinder, and a defense. What I want to say
about this article is that it is in many ways quintessential Greenawalt: a
careful, patient, searching inquiry that uncovers the many dimensions of
* George Welwood Murray Professor of Legal History Emerita, Dean of Faculty
Emerita, Columbia Law School.
1. Kent Greenawalt, The Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles, 78 Colum. L.
Rev. 982 (1978).
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the problem under examination; moderate, balanced, sensible conclu-
sions that add up to wisdom.
And so Kent went on to follow the examples of his teachers, and to
do them proud. He has produced a body of scholarship that, in its
breadth, and most particularly its depth, in its reach and in its richness,
puts him in the very top rank of legal scholars. But I want to suggest that
while thus honoring those who taught him, Kent has in important re-
spects departed from their ways. He has departed from traditional ways
because the world of the legal academy has itself departed from tradi-
tional ways. It has altered almost out of recognition, and Kent, as teacher,
as colleague, and as scholar, is as comfortably at home in this relatively
new universe as, when a student, he was comfortably at home in the old.
The differences between the law school of the early 1960s and that
of today are many and deep, but I just want to zero in on two of them,
one having directly to do with scholarship, the other somewhat more dif-
fusely with what I'll call the scholarly life.
In Kent's student days (and in mine as well almost a decade earlier)
it was an accepted precept that for something to merit the designation
"scholarship," it must be impersonal; at the Columbia Law School of the
time this was dogma. For a work of scholarship to be personal was as
great a sin, and the same genus, perhaps species, of sin, as for a judicial
ruling to be "result oriented." Even in such an intellectual climate, it is
often possible to see some hint of the person behind the scholar, but
typically the person who was the scholar would consider that something
of an embarrassment, an obstacle rather than an aid to the attainment of
the "objectivity" that alone was believed to legitimate scholarship. The
solidity of this belief can be seen in the small but nontrivial dictate that a
scholar steer clear of the first person singular: It was "we," "we," "we" (all
the way home, as it were).
The world of scholarship has cast off this precept with a vengeance;
it is a mere curiosity now, forgotten by most, and unheard of by the
young. An intellectual history of this change would, I am sure, reveal it to
have been more revolutionary than evolutionary, sweeping in with so
many social and cultural innovations in the 1970s, and related to some of
them-but that is an aside. The point here is that a fair bit of Kent's work
is personal, and some of it is deeply personal. And to me this property of
his work is a thing most decidedly of value. In the first place, it actually
aids in the attainment of genuine objectivity. Then, perhaps more sig-
nificantly, it gives to the work a quality-indeed a haunting qual-
ity-whose effect on the reader is wonderfully out of the ordinary course
of scholarly business.
Accompanying this salutary change in the rules of the scholarly
game there has been a virtual revolution in the scholarly life of a legal
academic. I can report that scholarship in my student days-and in
Kent's as well-was conceived of and practiced as a solitary endeavor. Of
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A TRIBUTE TO PROFESSOR GREENAWALT
course there were collaborations, usually on casebooks, now and again
on articles or treatises or monographs. But what was nowhere in sight was
the now-ubiquitous workshop. Perhaps in other disciplines, even then,
the practice of general collegial involvement in every step of each
colleague's scholarly process and progress was routine; in the legal
academy, until the 1970s, it was virtually nonexistent.
Kent is a full and extraordinarily valuable participant in this rela-
tively new-and better-universe, devoting time and talent to such en-
deavors as the legal theory workshop and philosophy workshops and sem-
inars, engaging with colleagues at faculty talks and on any number and
variety of communal scholarly occasions, offering encouragement to oth-
ers to join him in the scholarly enterprise.
Relatedly, Kent is always willing to engage in scholarly dialogue, and
has had much opportunity to do so, because the excellence and power of
his work has commanded so much attention. When he speaks, everyone
listens-and a good many comment. And not infrequently Kent has
joined issue with such commentators. Would that every academic, legal
or otherwise, were as respectful of his critics, as open-minded to contrary
opinion, as candid about his own uncertainties, as Kent Greenawalt.
It is conventional wisdom that no one of us is indispensable to a
great institution such as the Columbia Law School. But there are a few
who come mighty close to being exceptions to that rule, a few whom we
are tempted to think of as indispensable to the institution-and Kent
Greenawalt is one of that number. This was recognized by Columbia
University some years ago, when Kent was designated University
Professor. That was a happy moment for Kent's proud Dean, namely me:
Casting conventional wisdom dismissively to the wind, I did view Kent as
indispensable to this law school. And still do.
2015]
THREE DIMENSIONS OF KENT GREENAWALT'S
EXCELLENCE
Vincent Blasi*
Kent Greenawalt possesses so many admirable personal and
scholarly qualities that it is difficult to know where to begin. One of his
most notable traits is a penchant for specificity. He takes the trouble to
identify exactly what concerns, methods, assumptions, sources of auth-
ority, levels of confidence, and perceived implications inform his analysis.
When his grappling with a subject results in some irreducible indeter-
minacy, he specifies what it is. He deploys examples in abundance to
ratchet up the level of specificity. Here I want to emulate this worthy
characteristic of his scholarship by commenting upon three specific ways
in which Kent's work is distinctive to the point of being amazing.
I. DISTILLATION
All scholars need to schematize. We seek to identify patterns that
impose an order of sorts on unruly data and dynamic, elusive phenom-
ena. The reader's comprehension depends on it. The full complexity of
our understanding cannot be wholly transmitted. At least that is so if we
have something to offer that deserves to be called scholarship. The temp-
tation, however, is to undertake the schematizing before the process of
developing understanding is pursued to the fullest practical extent. The
orderly patterns take on a life of their own, untethered from the com-
plexity they are meant to illuminate. Kent resists that temptation better
than any scholar I know. His writing is replete with definitions, quali-
fications, and explanations of methodological choices, all of which testify
to the thoroughness and honesty of his inquisitive ventures and norm-
ative judgments. This is not to say that he fails to digest or prioritize the
results of his efforts. It is to say that he passes the Iceberg Test. What
appears in his writing rests on a mass of subsurface processing.
Some scholars succumb to a temptation that is the opposite of pre-
mature schematizing. Their published work reports their intellectual
odyssey so fully and faithfully that their discoveries (if such they be) are
more or less inaccessible to all but the most expert, motivated, and pa-
tient readers. They refuse to distill. That is a form of self-indulgence, and
Kent takes great care to avoid it.
One way he does this is by applying his general ideas to pressing
current issues, inevitably simplifying his theoretical insights even as he
pursues their practical implications all the way down to ground, specify-
ing how numerous close cases should on balance be resolved. For exam-
* Corliss Lamont Professor, Columbia Law School.
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pie, one of his best ideas is that communications that change the moral
relations of speakers and listeners the way threats, bribes, and certain
kinds of personal insults do constitute a special legally relevant category.
Kent calls such speech "situation-altering." Most communications that
convey opinions and information do so in a manner and context that, for
legal purposes, can be considered noncoercive. Situation-altering speech
is an exception by virtue of its function in altering moral relations. As
such, it has little or no claim to First Amendment protection, Kent main-
tains. This idea is important and subtle enough to require elaboration at
a level of refinement that can interest only fellow scholars (including stu-
dent-scholars, our most persuadable audience) and the odd devotee. But
the idea also is potentially significant operationally. For that reason, it
cries out for distillation and illustrative application in order to broaden
its appeal. Kent has made a point of supplying both.
His great book Speech, Crime, and the Uses of Language develops the
idea of situation-altering speech and explores its implications in consid-
erable detail.' The author's characteristic appreciation of complexity is
on full display. The book demands much of readers, and gives back
much in return. When I first read it, Ijudged it to be the best book about
the First Amendment that I had ever read. Nevertheless, I feared that the
book's unremitting fidelity to the difficulty of the questions it was explor-
ing would constrict its readership and shorten its lifespan. Happily, I was
dead wrong. More than twenty-five years later, the book is a resource of
choice for scholars seeking to identify the proper boundaries of First
Amendment coverage. During the last decade, the long-neglected
boundary question has been addressed more frequently, systematically,
and contentiously than ever before in the academic literature. I am
heartened by how routinely and in-depth Speech, Crime, and the Uses of
Language has been drawn upon in this much-needed correction. 2
One reason for the book's current prominence is that Kent followed
it with a different, much shorter book, Fighting Words, in which he applies
his conceptual insights, including the notion of situation-altering speech,
to a range of current issues: flag burning, racially derogatory speech,
workplace harassment, and obscenity, among others. 3 This book is easily
accessible and predominantly schematic, albeit more complete than most
such efforts in that it is full of examples that specify exactly where he
1. Kent Greenawalt, Speech, Crime, and the Uses of Language 57-68 (1989).
2. E.g., Thomas Healy, Brandenburg in a Time of Terror, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 655,
689-97 (2009); Steven R. Morrison, Conspiracy Law's Threat to Free Speech, 15 U. Pa. J.
Const. L. 865, 906-13 (2013); Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable
Laws, Illegal Courses of Conduct, "Situation-Altering Utterances," and the Uncharted
Zones, 90 Cornell L. Rev. 1277, 1326-35 (2005); Leslie Kendrick, Note, A Test for
Criminally Instructional Speech, 91 Va. L. Rev. 1973, 1979 (2005); Note, Rehabilitating the
Performative, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 2200, 2205-16 (2007).
3. Kent Greenawalt, Fighting Words: Individuals, Communities, and the Liberties of
Speech 28-46, 47-70, 77-96, 99-123 (1995).
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would "draw the line." I believe that Fighting Words helped to introduce
many readers to the idea of situation-altering speech, which led them
back to Kent's earlier, fuller exposition of the reasons for making it a
staple of First Amendment analysis. His classic article in the Columbia Law
Review, Free Speech Justifications,4 is another example of his commitment to
distillation. It is the standard go-to overview of the various reasons for a
strong free speech principle, the first place I send students about to com-
mence a First Amendment research project.
My point is that for all his scholarly integrity and ambition, Kent is
not too proud or purist to distill his complex ideas into operational form
so as to make them useful to persons who may not share his intellectual
priorities. He does not write exclusively to refine his own understanding
or persuade fellow experts. He writes as well for readers new to the sub-
ject and motivated largely by practical concerns. Not all scholars who
function at his level of sophistication can say that. And I think it serves
the law well when operationally workable formulations and line-drawing
judgments come from someone who has first attempted to understand
the underlying complexities to the fullest extent.
II. RANGE
Legal scholars differ considerably regarding how wide and various is
the range of their inquiries and acquired expertise. Some of us identify a
field of interest, then a set of ideas or problems within that field, then a
method of scholarly execution that draws on our perceived strengths or
fills gaps in the literature. We read and write in that vein almost
exclusively for an extended period of time, sometimes an entire career.
Other scholars are more versatile, usually because they are temperamen-
tally responsive to unforeseen events, opportunities, or promptings of
their curiosity. They make contributions, often of different sorts, to sev-
eral fields.
Kent is rare in that his work is unfailingly the product of patient,
thorough, balanced, nuanced exploration that bespeaks the wisdom and
humility that only extended engagement with a subject can bestow. Yet
somehow he has managed to practice that demanding method, to the
level of leader-in-the-field expertise, in at least six fields: freedom of reli-
gion, freedom of speech, constitutional theory, legal philosophy, legal
interpretation, and criminal law.
Moreover, even within a particular field, his work displays impressive
versatility. I have commented above on the variety of his free speech
scholarship. Regarding freedom of religion, his two-volume magnum
4. Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 119 (1989).
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opus, Religion and the Constitution,5 is, to put it mildly, an exhaustive
doctrinal inquiry. With characteristically balanced yet decisive and pene-
trating analysis, Kent canvasses every significant topic in the field, in-
cluding topics only beginning to emerge on the doctrinal horizon. Very
different is an earlier book, Religious Convictions and Political Choice.6
There he explores whether, when, and how various political actors
should be guided by their religious beliefs and perceived duties when
making decisions in the capacity of a public official or responsible
citizen.7 In the field of legal interpretation, Kent has contributed much
to the vigorous modern debates regarding statutory interpretation. 8 But
unlike many participants in those debates, he has had a lot to say about
common law interpretation as well.9
In no sense is Kent Greenawalt a prisoner of his expertise or
preeminence. His inquisitiveness remains his most defining character-
istic. He is not afraid to roam or take chances. Best of all, his astonishing
range and volume of output come at no tradeoff in quality. In setting
standards for himself, he does not exploit the intellectual authority he
has earned to reduce his burden of persuasion. His work is as thoroughly
argued as that of an ambitious beginner seeking to make a mark.
III. PLURALISM
In the circles in which most of us, including Kent, travel, pluralism is
honored. Isaiah Berlin's admonitions" about the dangers of seeking or
claiming to have found the "one right answer" to any question are cele-
brated. But of course, almost all of us are closet dogmatists, at least about
the matters we know and care most about. These hypocrisies are a matter
of degree, but degrees matter. Kent is among the least dogmatic scholars
I know. He demonstrates that quality in at least three different ways.
First, he works harder than anyone I read to articulate and respond
to the best arguments that might be advanced against the positon he is
maintaining. This is a practice recommended by Cicero and much ad-
mired byJohn Stuart Mill," but it is hard to execute faithfully. The whole
value of the enterprise depends on going far beyond grudging lip service.
5. 2 Kent Greenawalt, Religion and the Constitution: Establishment and Fairness
(2008); 1 Kent Greenawalt, Religion and the Constitution: Free Exercise and Fairness
(2006).
6. Kent Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Political Choice (1988).
7. See id. at 231-41 (concluding religion inevitably informs decisions of citizens and
legislators, and even judges, "within the constraints of the judicial role, should be able to
rely on religious premises").
8. E.g., Kent Greenawalt, Statutory and Common Law Interpretation 19-74 (2013).
9. E.g., id. at 177-277.
10. See Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty 167-72, 189-92 (Henry Hardy ed.,
1969).




It is tempting to try to co-opt imagined opponents by disingenuously stat-
ing their arguments in a superficially appealing form as a predicate for
demonstrating that the appeal is only on the surface. But the illumi-
nating way to use opposing arguments in a scholarly endeavor is to artic-
ulate them fully, clearly, and cogently, indeed to develop them creatively
in order to learn their strengths. This includes resisting the urge to
inflate them, if only slightly, so as to discredit them as overreaching.
Discussing opposing arguments productively takes a lot of self-discipline.
Kent is scrupulous in that regard and I admire him-envy him-for that.
Second, it is a special treat, one I have experienced many times, to
get back critical comments from Kent on a manuscript one has pro-
duced. What is special about this experience is that the critical comments
invariably are within the parameters and in the service of one's own pro-
ject, not the project as Kent would have conceived it had he been pursu-
ing it. The comments are highly selective because Kent appreciates, as
most of us do not, that an author in the midst of a project can absorb
only so much constructive criticism without losing his highly personal
focus and inspiration. Better yet, the comments are unusually construc-
tive in that they proceed from a close reading of the author's actual
detailed argument. This is still another way in which Kent's penchant for
specificity helps. Miscommunication is endemic in scholarly discussion.
All of us feel misunderstood in the sense that no matter how hard we try
to be clear about our claims, our readers too often seem to be respond-
ing to a version of our arguments that we don't embrace (or sometimes
even recognize). Never with Kent. He gets it. The first time through.
Even when he thinks you are wrong.
This devotion to close, faithful reading surfaces also in the many
workshops in which Kent participates. His questions are always succinct,
on the mark, and in the spirit-as defined by the author of the paper
under discussion, not critics with different agendas.
Third, Kent honors pluralism in the way he conducts himself in
faculty hiring decisions. Typically, we professed pluralists believe that a
strong faculty requires a balanced mix of diverse skills, values, types of
knowledge and experience, interests, agendas, and talents, and that the
current imbalance would be corrected if we could only hire two or three
more persons like ourselves. I have never seen Kent put his thumb on the
scale like that. He is not overly generous in evaluating candidates who
share his orientation, nor overly critical of candidates whose hiring would
exacerbate an imbalance away from the kinds of things he and like-
minded colleagues do. He tries hard and successfully to understand what
excellence consists in for work far afield from his own.
Most of us, I like to think, are capable of being pluralists in these
ways, even if we can never hope to match Kent's scholarly range, sophis-
tication, integrity, and versatility. But whether the various examples he
sets are within or beyond our own prospects of emulation, all of us who
have worked with him during his fifty years on the Columbia faculty (!)
[Vol. 115:780
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cannot help but be inspired by the privilege. That such a remarkable
scholar, teacher, and colleague should also be a genuinely good man and
caring friend is all the more reason to consider this rare milestone truly a
grand occasion.
"THINK HARDER, DO MORE, STUDY BETTER":
A TRIBUTE TO KENT GREENAWALT
Elizabeth F Emens *
The first volume of Kent Greenawalt's Religion and the Constitution' is,
according to one review, "written with elegance, power, and lucidity-
and filled with the kind of wit, wisdom, and Wissenschaft that Greenawalt's
readers have come to expect from his dozen earlier tomes on the consti-
tutional and philosophical foundations of law, religion, and morality."
2
The book is hailed as an "invaluable resource"3 and the author "a mas-
terful guide to the range of issues and varied sources concerning free
exercise. '
Over the years, I have asked my Employment Discrimination stu-
dents to read selections from this volume. The following passage always
sparks lively discussions:
Yet in one aspect religious discrimination differs from other dis-
criminations to which it is commonly linked. Some religious dis-
crimination is what I shall call "positive," a desire to be with
people like oneself rather than hostility to those who are differ-
ent. Such "positive" religious discrimination may not be wrong-
ful in itself.
5
The students are deeply divided in their responses. While some agree
that religion is somehow different from other protected classifications in
inspiring forms of in-group preference untainted by hostility to out-
groups, many disagree.
Some students disagree only because they battle a ghost. They read
Greenawalt to imply that religious discrimination is always "positive" and
never rooted in animus or hostility. This misreads Greenawalt, who
makes clear a few sentences later his view that "much religious discrim-
ination ... is ugly, based on bigotry and unjustified stereotypes."6
* Isidor and Seville Sulzbacher Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. For read-
ing and commenting on an earlier draft, I thank Noa Ben-Asher, Bernard Harcourt, and
Susan Sturm, and for excellent editorial suggestions and research assistance, I thank Ilan
Stein and Joshua Wan. My appreciation also goes to Richard Cleary and the other editors
of the Columbia Law Review for their work on this well-deserved collection of tributes.
1. 1 Kent Greenawalt, Religion and the Constitution: Free Exercise and Fairness
(2006) [hereinafter Greenawalt, Free Exercise].
2. John Witte, Jr., "Fairer Still the Woodlands": Mapping the Free Exercise Forest, 24
Const. Comment. 551,553 (2007) (book review).
3. L.Joseph Hebert, 17 Law & Pol. Book Rev. 71-74 (2007).
4. Id. at 71.
5. Greenawalt, Free Exercise, supra note 1, at 328.
6. Id. at 329.
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Others offer more trenchant reasons for disagreeing with
Greenawalt's claim that religion is different, arguing that protected clas-
sifications other than religion-such as race or sex-can also inspire in-
group affinities that are "positive." They then puzzle over whether they
believe that only subordinated groups (such as blacks or women) can
form what they consider exclusively positive affiliations. And yet others
disagree for the opposite reason: They believe that affiliations organized
around these protected classifications are never untouched by hostility to
out-groups.
Whatever one's position on these generalizations, anyone who knows
Kent Greenawalt the person should not be surprised that he would write
such a passage about the existence of nonhostile discrimination. We of-
ten write from who we are, even in our scholarly mode. And Kent is a
person of such kindness and integrity that he may well assume that the
best is possible in others.
Kent writes very little directly about himself. An exception is the
early pages of Religious Convictions and Political Choice,7 where he briefly
traces the origins of his sustained study of the interplay between religion
and law. He writes there of his childhood, having been "raised in a family
in which both religion and the values of liberal democracy were seriously
regarded,"8 and of his early beliefs: "During my youth, I took it for
granted that one's religious commitments and understandings would
matter for one's life, including one's life as a citizen, and that liberal de-
mocracy was a system of governance that warranted support."9 These
views were reflected and strengthened in his public-service endeavors,
including a "summer spent in East Harlem working under Norman Eddy
in the East Harlem Protestant Parish"' and a month working for the
Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights in Jackson, Mississippi, in the sum-
mer of 1965, He was also influenced by the political work of several close
friends and relatives-"all ministers for whom questions of social justice
have loomed as very important." l At this point in the text, he offers a
rare glimpse into his own religious practice: "Though in my adult life I
have been only an occasional churchgoer, these close associations have
helped confirm my continuing belief in the importance of religious
understanding." 12 He continues in this vein in the first chapter:
With some uncertainty and tentativeness, I hold religious con-
victions, but I find myself in a pervasively secular discipline. My
convictions tell me that no aspect of life should be wholly
7. Kent Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Political Choice (1988).
8. Id. at vii. He also tells us that his father was "long head of the board of trustees of
the Plymouth Church of the Pilgrims" and "as a child [Greenawalt] went there as well as
to the local community church in which [Greenawalt] was confirmed." Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.




untouched by the transcendent reality in which I believe, yet a
basic premise of common legal argument is that any reference
to such perspective is out of bounds. This personal and profes-
sional dilemma helps explain my concern with the place of reli-
gious convictions in the process by which laws are made.
13
These experiences among others-including his reading of Reinhold
Niebuhr and his congenial disagreements with Bruce Ackerman-shaped
the question that would ultimately drive the book, namely, "whether
people ... properly rely on their religious convictions in deciding what
public laws and policies to support."14
The book is of course not about Kent Greenawalt. He makes a point
of reminding us, after this unusual foray into the personal, that the book
is "not relating a personal search for accommodation or explaining
where one peculiar set of religious convictions leads."15 Rather, "the anal-
ysis and conclusions I offer do not depend on the truth or falsity of par-
ticular religious positions; they lay claim to broader persuasiveness." 6
And yet he intends to reach not only those who have thought deeply
about these issues already, not only the scholars among or within us. His
aims are more broadly humane: "I also hope [the book] will be of some
help for those who are trying to sort out in their own lives the appro-
priate domains of religion and politics." 7
The help Kent offers these individual readers is not only a nuanced
examination of the issues, but a bold and generous conclusion. The book
confronts the "many intellectuals who think that religious convictions are
foolish superstitions" and "want to minimize their legitimate position in
social life without confronting them head on."1 8 Kent concludes that "the
claim that citizens and legislators should rely exclusively on secular
grounds" is "not only wrong but absurd."19 Such a claim, he explains,
"invites religious persons to displace their most firmly rooted convictions
about values and about the nature of humanity and the universe in a
quest for common bases of judgment that is inevitably unavailing when
virtually everyone must rely on personal perspectives.120 Instead of the
mere "tolerance of indifference" popular in some intellectual circles,
Kent argues that "liberalism demands a high degree of tolerance.., of a
sympathetic mutual understanding of the place that religious premises
occupy in the life of serious believers and of the dangers to those of
different beliefs if religious convictions and discourse overwhelm the
13. Id. at 5.
14. Id. at 4.
15. Id. at 5.
16. Id.
17. Id. atx.




2015] A TRIBUTE TO PROFESSOR GREENAWALT 789
common dialogue of rational secular morality."'z We are all in it together
and must tread carefully, respecting each other's beliefs while striving
toward a shared moral language.
Kent has a brilliant mind, as many a student evaluation will attest.
The intimate look offered in this brief Tribute, largely drawn from just
one of his many books, illuminates some of his other notable traits: his
generosity, his integrity, and his kindness.
Kent not infrequently comes to a workshop having read the pre-
senter's draft so closely that he can point out even the smallest mistake in
reasoning. His meticulousness stems not only from his rigor and earnest-
ness as a scholar, but from his generosity as a colleague. He wants every-
one around him to be a clearer thinker and writer. His ardent pursuit of
what's right and correct, delivered with his characteristic grace and kind-
ness, typically becomes more gift than challenge.
I conclude with some words from his students. Describing Kent as "a
fantastic teacher," one observes, "[h]is greatest strength is his ability to
probe students and point out weaknesses in arguments without being
aggressive or critical. However, he also never lets a comment pass that is
partly thought through. He is really engaged in testing students and im-
proving their thinking."22 And 'another writes, "Professor Greenawalt is
the ideal law school professor. He knows everything, indulges your ideas,
encourages interesting discussion, and has an academic spirit that in-
spires you to think harder, do more, and study better."23 It is an honor to
be his colleague and his friend.
21. Id. (emphasis added).
22. Columbia Law Sch., Seminar on Legal Interpretation, Course Evaluations, Fall
2014 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
23. Columbia Law Sch., Seminar on Legal Interpretation, Course Evaluations, Fall
2007 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
PROFESSOR GREENAWALT'S UNFASHIONABLE IDEA
H. Jefferson Powell*
To understand why Kent Greenawalt is a legal scholar of the first
order, we need to grasp just how completely indifferent he has been to
the intellectual fashions of the day. The man is a closet radical. Beneath a
personal congeniality and a generous courtesy to the work of others that
are all too unusual in the contemporary legal academy, Professor
Greenawalt has shown no respect for assumptions that most of us, in the
academy and elsewhere, accept at so deep a level that we seldom need to
state or to discuss them. Scholarly contumacy is what I call it, and it is
high time Greenawalt is unmasked for the revolutionary he truly is. In
order to do so effectively, however, we need first to review what we all
know but seldom talk about.
I.
Ever since the Enlightenment, for many intellectuals, religion has
seemed peculiarly resistant to thought. It makes factual assertions that
are ungrounded, moral demands that are nonnegotiable, social claims
that are at one and the same time impossibly parochial and terrifyingly
imperialistic. From this perspective, religion is a, or even the, great antag-
onist of the cool, dispassionate, universal Reason that is and was the great
Enlightenment ideal. The perception that eighteenth-century ration-
alism was at war with fundamentally irrational religious commitments was
itself already a common idea in the era of the philosophes. In August
1739, the distinguished English philosopher Joseph Butler rebuked the
famous evangelistJohn Wesley: "Sir, the pretending to extraordinary rev-
elations and gifts of the Holy Ghost is a horrid thing, a very horrid
thing."' To be sure, Butler was himself a devout Christian (in fact, a
bishop of the Church of England), and his objection to Wesley's preach-
ing stemmed, in part, from intramural Anglican disagreements over
church order.2 But as Butler's overheated language suggested, under-
neath Butler's starchy concern for episcopal authority lay his horrified
fear that Wesley and those like him were simply providing evidence for
* Professor of Law, Duke University.
1. Immense, Unfathomed, Unconfined 258 (Sean Winter ed., 2013). Butler did
important work in ethics and the philosophy of mind and identity; his Analogy of Religion,
Natural and Revealed was an influential defense of the rationality of orthodox Christianity.
On Butler's continuing relevance in moral philosophy, see, e.g., Tom Regan, Moore's Use
of Butler's Maxim, 16J. Value Inquiry 153, 159 (1982) (discussing Butler's influence in
twentieth century moral philosophy).
2. Wesley was not the anirational religious zealot Butler feared, and Butler was not
the vaguely Deistic ecclesiastical politician eighteenth-century English bishops are some-
times thought to have been.
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the assertion that religion is, in the end, an irrational phenomenon: One
can make sense of religion (in terms of history or politics or superstition
or what we now would call anthropology or psychology), but one cannot
make sense with or in religion. Religious claims, on this view, simply can't
be fit into rational discourse.
In a strangely parallel fashion, for many intellectuals-at least in
American law schools-the law itself has come to seem similarly resistant
to thought in the wake of what I suppose we must call postmodernism.
This is a highly significant (if vastly understudied) development in recent
American intellectual history. In early modernity, common lawyers
understood the art and science of which they were masters to be a species
of rational inquiry so clearly intertwined that law and reason could hardly
be distinguished: As Lord Coke famously claimed, "[r] eason is the life of
the law; nay, the common law itselfe is nothing else but reason."3 In many
types of social controversy, to put the matter a little less exuberantly, legal
analysis and argument are the tools of choice, on Coke's view, if we wish
to resolve a controversy through reason rather than brute force. Coke's
law, unlike the irrational religiosity Bishop Butler feared, is the ally and
servant of reason.
Lord Coke is dead, alas, and his successors, many of them, have
quietly disavowed their inheritance. Why they have done so is not always
clear. It has long been obvious that there are dangers inherent in Coke's
equation of law and reason. As Justice Holmes and many others have
pointed out, the "reason" of the law can ossify into a self-contained con-
ceptual system of abstractions and generalizations that lose touch with
reality and in particular with the social goods that the legal system exists
to serve. 4 "We must think things not words," as Holmes put it, "or at least
we must constantly translate our words into the facts for which they
stand, if we are to keep to the real and the true."5 Legal concepts should
be means to the end of understanding the realities of the social world
and addressing its problems, not mystifications or blinders.
6
Holmes's intent was to criticize and thus correct a maldevelopment
in legal reasoning, not to jettison the ideal of law as reason altogether.7
3. Edward Coke, The First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England *97b (1628).
4. See, e.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes,Jr., Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 Harv.
L. Rev. 443, 460 (1899) (distinguishing teaching legal "dogma" from inquiry into "the real
justification of a rule of law [which] is that it helps to bring about a social end which we
desire").
5. Id.
6. Holmes's great line about the life of the law opposes "experience" (engagement
with social reality) to "logic" (disengaged conceptualism of the sort he equated with Dean
Langdell), not to the "reason" that the common lawyers at their best aspired to follow.
7. See, e.g., the peroration at the close of Holmes's Path of the Law, with its invo-
cation of "the command of ideas" as the greatest ambition in the law: "It is through them
that you not only become a great master in your calling, but connect your subject with the
universe and catch an echo of the infinite, a glimpse of its unfathomable process, a hint of
the universal law." Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 478
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But just such a retreat from Coke's equation underlies much that has
happened in the legal academy and, what is equally to the point, in the
jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court, over the past few
decades. Many academics have come to think of traditional legal reason-
ing much the same way that an Enlightenment Deist thought of tradi-
tional religion, an anti-intellectual fraud to be seen through, not thought
with. Law, traditional legal thought, isn't reason-it's obfuscation. The
Justices, who don't have an academic's luxury of turning to other and
more fashionable intellectual pursuits, increasingly show signs that they
are giving up on many of the traditional tools of legal thought and deci-
sion-precedent, analogy, normative argument-and turning to other
means of executing their duty to reach reasonable decisions.8
Nowhere have the effects been clearer from the slow erosion of
implicit confidence in the traditional tools of their own trade than in the
Justices' decisions involving the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses
of the First Amendment. This is hardly surprising. In the post-
Enlightenment world of Supreme Court jurisprudence, the
Enlightenment difficulty with fitting the claims of religion into any
rational framework was always going to make decisions under the reli-
gion clauses difficult. For example, a quarter century ago, Michael
Sandel described the Court's religion clause jurisprudence as an attempt
to assimilate the idea of religious liberty into an ostensibly rational frame-
work in which liberty is understood as protected by governmental neu-
trality toward individual preferences. As Sandel persuasively argued, reli-
gion is precisely not a matter of choice for (many) religious people, and
treating it as such "confuses the pursuit of preferences with the exercise
of duties" when dealing with "persons bound by [religious] duties they
have not chosen."9 If Sandel's overall analysis was correct, the Court's
modern religion clause case law got off on the wrong foot and needed a
significant course correction if it was to fulfill the constitutional premise
of religious freedom. Traditional legal reasoning allows for the possibility
of such missteps and provides avenues for correction, but in an age
where professors and Justices alike have lost confidence in the reason of
the law, one might suspect that the Court would find it well-nigh impos-
sible to find the path of reason in dealing with religion.
And so it has proved. The law of the religion clauses, almost every-
one agrees, is a mess. For almost forty years the Supreme Court ostensibly
enforced the Free Exercise Clause by applying the compelling interest
test-and a form of judicial scrutiny that in other contexts nearly always
proves fatal to the action under scrutiny proved (inexplicably) less strin-
(1897). Now is not the occasion to debate anyone inclined to dismiss Holmes's language as
a mere rhetorical flourish.
8. As yet the members of the Court haven't turned up any compelling alternatives,
in my judgment, but that too is a debate for another day.
9. Michael J. Sandel, Freedom of Conscience or Freedom of Choice?, in Articles of
Faith, Articles of Peace 91, 92 (1990).
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gent when religious free exercise was at stake. In 1990, the Court exe-
cuted an abrupt, if rhetorical, about-face and reduced free exercise anal-
ysis to a form of discrete-and-insular minority review with very little prac-
tical significance.'" The Smith decision achieved doctrinal coherence (the
Court's rhetoric now matches the predictable results) at the expense of
draining the principle of free exercise of any independent significance;"'
in its inability even to comprehend "the special concern of religious
liberty with the claims of conscientiously encumbered selves," 2 the Smith
majority betrayed its underlying assumption that religious commitments
are inherently arational.13
The tale of modern Establishment Clause doctrine is more compli-
cated but, in the end, no less depressing. In 1971, the Supreme Court
announced in Lemon v. Kurtzman a three-party inquiry as a means of
analyzing Establishment Clause cases. 14 Lemon reflected the penchant of
its era for multifactor "tests" that promised more analytical clarity than
they could deliver, but subsequent decisions substituted palpable anarchy
for illusory precision. Without ever overruling or doing much in the way
of modifying the "Lemon test," the Court has vacillated-often without
even acknowledging the fact-among Lemon, variations based on the
different prongs of Lemon, and entirely distinct approaches to
Establishment Clause analysis, some of which are quite inconsistent with
Lemon. 5 In 1993, Justice Scalia observed that a majority of the then-
10. Compare Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406-07 (1963) (applying "compelling
state interest" test in First Amendment analysis), with Emp't Div., Dept. of Human Res. of
Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883-90 (1990) (deeming "compelling interest" inapplicable to
prohibition at issue and questioning its validity generally). The political branches reacted
to this judicial deletion of a constitutional provision by enacting a statute intended to
restore the compelling interest test, but a Court badly divided over Smith found common
ground in the proposition that Congress can't overrule the Court. See City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (invalidating Religious Freedom Restoration Act as applied to
states). For a demonstration that the Act did no such thing in the constitutionally objec-
tionable sense, see Sasnett v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1018, 1020-21 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, C.J.),
vacated, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997).
11. Professor Greenawalt has written that "despite its protestations that it is faithful to
prior principles and will have little practical effect, [Smith] performs radical surgery on the
scope of free exercise claims." 1 Kent Greenwalt, Religion and the Constitution: Free
Exercise and Fairness 442 (2006) [hereinafter Greenawalt, Free Exercise and Fairness].
12. Sandel, supra note 9, at 91.
13. This assumption, particularly when it remains at the level of unquestioned assum-
ption, is perfectly compatible with religious commitments on the part of those who hold it.
Not all religious people agree with Bishop Butler that reason and true religion are and
must be ultimately compatible.
14. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) ("Three such tests may be
gleaned from our cases. First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second,
its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion;
finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.'"
(internal citations omitted))
15. For a recent, and admirably sardonic, summary of the incoherence of the Court's
case law, along with its confusing effects on the lower courts, see Utah Highway Patrol
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sitting Justices had rejected Lemon's authority, but nevertheless, "[1] ike
some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its
grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried,
Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence."1 6 A quarter-cen-
tury later, a majority of the Court-perhaps by now amounting to a con-
sensus of the Justices-continues to agree that Lemon is inadequate, but
the Court continues to invoke it as controlling-sometimes.17 Opinions
that invoke Lemon under these circumstances inevitably have the feel of
verbal compromises intended to paper over conflicting and inconsistent
views on how the Court should address Establishment Clause issues.18
One might try to excuse these inconsistencies by pointing to the fact that
the decisions of a multimember Court will inevitably reflect the differing
jurisprudential views of its members, but this explanation rests on the
assumption (a correct one, I think) that the Justices have lost faith in the
power of traditional legal reason to resolve difficult issues.1 Judges in the
law-is-reason tradition of Lord Coke-and Justice Holmes-would have
recognized an obligation to serve "the integrative and rationalizing
Assoc. v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 132S. Ct. 12, 14-20 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial
of cert.) ("Our jurisprudence provides no principled basis by which a lower court could
discern whether Lemon/endorsement, or some other test, should apply in Establishment
Clause cases... lower courts have understandably expressed confusion.").
16. Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993)
(Scalia,J., concurring in the judgment).
17. See McCreary Cnty. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 859-66
(2005) (applying Lemon's three-part test for determining secular purpose). On the same
day, and in a case involving the same basic question (does a governmental display of the
Ten Commandments violate the Establishment Clause?), the lead opinion concluded that
"[w]hatever may be the fate of the Lemon test in the larger scheme of Establishment
Clause jurisprudence, we think it not useful in dealing with the sort of passive monument."
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686 (2005) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (plurality opinion).
18. In Van Orden, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that "[m]any of our recent cases
simply have not applied the Lemon test [while] [o]thers have applied it only after con-
cluding that the challenged practice was invalid under a different Establishment Clause
test." 545 U.S. at 686.
19. It is striking that the most methodologically self-conscious of the currentJustices
endorse approaches to the Establishment Clause that eschew traditional legal reasoning
altogether. Justice Thomas, for example, rejects any application-by-analogy of the
Establishment Clause to issues not within the original meaning of "establishment" as he
perceives that meaning, i.e., "'coercion of religious orthodoxy and of financial support by
force of law and threat of penalty."' Id. at 693 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citation omitted); see
also Utah Highway Patrol Assoc., 132 S. Ct. at 16 (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of cert.)
(criticizing "superficiality and irrationality of a jurisprudence meant to assess whether
government has made a law 'respecting an establishment of religion"). Justice Breyer is
similarly critical of "any set of formulaic tests" for resolving difficult Establishment Clause
cases, but for Thomas's positivist originalism, Breyer proposes to substitute a fact-and-
consequences-driven judgment based on his "consideration of the basic purposes of
the... Religion Clauses" as he perceives those purposes. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 702-04
(Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct.
1811, 1839-41 (2014) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing five "factors that I believe under-
lie the conclusion that, on the particular facts of this case... [hiaving applied my legal
judgment to the relevant facts").
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functions of doctrinal analysis" rather than permitting Establishment
Clause doctrine to descend into chaos.20 For postmodern judges who
have seen through the forms of the law, there is no such obligation, and
our postmodern Justices have accordingly gone on to other modes of
decision.
A subject for decision, religion, that is intrinsically beyond reason.
An empty language of decision, law, that ultimately masks reasoning
based on other considerations-history, empirical sociology, economics,
etc., as the decisionmaker finds most persuasive. Who would be so intel-
lectually obstreperous as to suggest that we tackle conflicts involving reli-
gion by thinking about them within the internal rationality of the law?
The idea is positively medieval and quite contrary to the spirit of our age.
It would take a remarkably bold (not to mention rebellious) individual to
undertake such a project. Enter Professor Greenawalt, who has been pur-
suing, with marvelous success, exactly that project for many years. 21
II.
Kent Greenawalt has always taken a broad view of what legal scholar-
ship can and often should involve. Even in his early work, the overlap be-
tween legal and moral concerns was an important theme. Early articles
addressed substantive themes such as civil disobedience, moral obligation
and the law, and specific issues such as the legal and ethical significance
of silence, while other pieces displayed his ability to write in jurispru-
dence and analytical philosophy.22 Eventually the big books in this vein
followed-legal and moral conflict, the idea of objectivity in law, and the
value for law of interpretive theory23-while other work applied
Greenawalt's philosophical and legal expertise to the difficult questions
raised by the Constitution's guaranty of freedom of expression. 24 Ordi-
nary mortals would have viewed these endeavors as enough to fill a
couple of CVs,25 but if Greenawalt had stopped here, he might not have
20. Charles Fried, Foreword: Revolutions?, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 13, 70 (1995).
21. As I acknowledge just below, religion and law is not the only subject in Professor
Greenawalt's extensive oeuvre.
22. E.g., Kent Greenawalt, A Contextual Approach to Disobedience, 70 Colum. L.
Rev. 48 (1970); Kent Greenawalt, The Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles, 78
Colum. L. Rev. 982 (1978); Kent Greenawalt, How Empty Is the Idea of Equality?, 83
Colum. L. Rev. 1167 (1983); Kent Greenawalt, Silence as a Moral and Constitutional Right,
23 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 15, 19 (1981).
23. Kent Greenawalt, Conflicts of Law and Morality (1987); Kent Greenawalt, Law
and Objectivity (1992); Kent Greenawalt, Legal Interpretation: Perspectives from Other
Disciplines and Private Texts (2010).
24. E.g., Kent Greenawalt, Fighting Words (1995); Kent Greenawalt, Speech, Crime
and the Uses of Language (1989); Kent Greenawalt, Viewpoints from Olympus, 96 Colum.
L. Rev. 697 (1996).
25. I will not try to convict Professor Greenawalt of prolixity by citing any of his excel-
lent work on criminal law topics unrelated to free speech.
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been able to show that he was other than tireless and extremely gifted.
Adding a long and illustrious series of articles, essays, and books on the
legal and political issues raised by religious commitment was not just a
natural extension of his other interests.26 Doing so enabled him to bring
out into the open his insouciant disregard for the common wisdom of
the era: Greenawalt, it seems, did not get the memo that law isn't reason
and religion can't be dealt with reasonably. Instead, he went about prov-
ing both convictions dead wrong.
27
Let us start with Professor Greenawalt's approach to religion. In
contrast to the high Court (as both Professor Sandel and I would read its
decisions), Greenawalt does not attempt to assimilate religious commit-
ments to the model (ultimately economic) of individual personal prefer-
ences of a nonrational character. Greenawalt understands that for many
(probably most) people for whom religion is significant, their religious
commitments and convictions are not choices that they could have made
otherwise, and might decide to change tomorrow: The claims of religion
are instead obligations that encumber and define the self and that can-
not be set aside without serious injury.28 That is not because he would
exclude from constitutional or political consideration those elements of
religious commitment or practice that do not meet some external,
rationalistic criterion of acceptability: Religion typically involves a mix-
ture of rational and nonrational elements ... but then such a mixture is
characteristic of human thought and action more generally, whether or
not a given individual is religious.29 The nonrational aspect of religious
26. As with other topics, I make no effort to list all the work. The articles are early
and late. E.g., Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 Cal. L.
Rev. 753 (1984); Kent Greenawalt, Religious Toleration and Claims of Conscience, 21 J.
Contemp. Legal Issues 449 (2013). As for the books, see Kent Greenawalt, Does God
Belong in Public Schools? (2007); Kent Greenawalt, Private Consciences and Public
Reasons (1995); 2 Kent Greenawalt, Religion and the Constitution: Establishment and
Fairness (2008) [hereinafter Greenawalt, Establishment and Fairness]; Greenawalt, Free
Exercise and Fairness, supra note 11; Kent Greenawalt, Religious Consciences and Political
Choice (1991).
27. I shall not attempt to trace developments in Professor Greenawalt's thought
about religion or law, not because his thinking has remained static, but because his work
for many years has displayed the admirable characteristics I discuss.
28. Greenawalt often acknowledges this important point, both in general and with
respect to specific issues. See, e.g., Greenawalt, Establishment and Fairness, supra note 26,
at 139 (discussing why "[it] is not hard to see" certain Christians' objections to theory of
evolution); Greenawalt, Free Exercise and Fairness, supra note 11, at 439 (referring to
"widespread sense that one's religious obligations are more ultimate than those of the
social order"); Kent Greenawalt, Religion and Public Reasons: Making Laws and
Evaluating Candidates, 27 J.L. & Pol. 387, 405 (2012) ("For many people, their religious
convictions and affiliation are an important part of who they are.").
29. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Religiously Based Judgments and Discourse in
Political Life, 22 St. John's J. Legal Comment. 445, 460, 480 (2007) ("In much of what we
believe, rational understanding, however that is conceived, intertwines with other assum-
ptions .... In making up their minds about [a difficult legal or moral issue] everybody will
rely to an extent on nonrational (I do not say irrational) intuitions.").
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commitment does not place it beyond the scope of reasoned discussion,
in part because everyone draws on such nonrational sources of belief and
action.
At the same time, Greenawalt refuses to convert "religion" into a
synonym for whatever are a person's deepest moral convictions, an intel-
lectual sleight of hand that makes all positions into "religious" ones and
thereby drains the religion clauses of independent significance.30 The
result is that we can reason from a clear-headed understanding of the
nature of religious commitment to conclusions about its role in a diverse
and liberal society.
I think the sense of obligation to an entity beyond oneself that is
so important for most religious believers is a powerful enough
reason to warrant giving legal protection to some religious
claims of conscience that do not involve moral conclusions,
while protection is denied for nonreligious, nonmoral claims.
No reason comparable to the believer's sense of obligation to a
higher authority applies when a nonbeliever's sense of what the
nonbeliever should do is outside the realm of morality.3
In Professor Greenawalt's world, argument over how far the political
community can accommodate the distinctive needs of religious people
and about the extent to which it cannot do so does not take us outside
the realm of reasoned discussion.
What about reason and the law? The evidence is clear: Professor
Greenawalt is an unabashed reactionary, a true disciple of Lord Coke,
even if his erudition, his analytical sophistication, and his fair-minded
presentation of opposing arguments tend to disguise the fact. A few years
ago, Greenawalt conceded that his "own position about constitutional
interpretation [was] fairly labeled 'eclectic.' I believe a range of consider-
ations are relevant besides original understanding, however that is con-
ceived, and that no neat ordering or precise method of weighing can be
assigned. ' 32 But the adjective is misleading to the extent that it suggests
30. See, for example, Greenawalt's careful discussion of how far to extend the scope
of "religion," Greenawalt, Free Exercise and Fairness, supra note 11, at 129-56, and his
conclusion that
refus[ing] to conflate religion and conscience is not only the most sound in
terms of constitutional language, it also allows a nuanced evaluation of constitu-
tional claims for equality. Concerns about equality that have led some scholars to
a very broad constitutional definition of religion can better be handled by more
discrete inquiries about equal treatment.
Id. at 156.
31. Kent Greenawalt, The Significance of Conscience, 47 San Diego L. Rev. 901, 916
(2010).
32. Kent Greenawalt, Fundamental Questions About the Religion Clauses:
Reflections on Some Critiques, 47 San Diego L. Rev. 1131, 1142 (2010) [hereinafter
Greenawalt, Fundamental Questions]; see also Kent Greenawalt, How Does "Equal
Liberty" Fare in Relation to Other Approaches to the Religion Clauses?, 85 Tex. L. Rev.
1217, 1218 (2007) (referring to "the more eclectic approach I support" in religion clause
analysis). In an early essay, Greenawalt identified a "moderate and eclectic" approach to
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that Greenawalt adopts an ad hoc, all-things-considered approach to the
analysis of religion clause issues. What Greenawalt means by the modest
word "eclectic" is that in addressing a constitutional question he employs
the full range of traditional legal tools," seeking the answer that makes
the best sense of the positive legal authorities that are relevant in light of
what he takes to be the fundamental purposes of the constitutional text.
3 4
Greenawalt, furthermore, has expressed his adherence to Coke's
high vision of law in the most dramatic academic fashion imaginable for
someone writing on constitutional issues. We live in an era in which elite
law professors tend to think of the doctrinal treatise as either impossible
(there is too little agreement to make a treatise intellectually cohesive) or
pedestrian (the law being essentially empty). 5 But after years of impor-
tant work on the ethical, political, and social problems raised by religious
commitments in a liberal society, much of it more easily treated as moral
philosophy or political theory rather than law, Greenawalt's magnum
opus on the subject is a treatise on the constitutional law of the religion
clauses. In Greenawalt's hands, theories (his own as well as those of
others) have become the servant of his analysis of specific cases and
legal decisionmaking with Cardozo and the mainstream of American jurisprudential
thought. Kent Greenawalt, Discretion and Judicial Decision: The Elusive Quest for the
Fetters that BindJudges, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 359, 359 (1975).
33. As Greenawalt recently put it,
[a]mong the relevant considerations beyond the applicable constitutional text
[that he considers] are prior legal decisions and the principles they announce,
traditions within the country, contemporary values and understandings, the
implications of fundamental principles, and the desirability of standards that can
give relatively clear guidance to judges and to citizens.
Greenawalt, Fundamental Questions, supra note 32, at 1142-43. Unlike contemporary
constitutionalists who believe that the "correct" approach to constitutional questions
generates incontestably correct answers, Greenawalt recognizes that there is no algorithm
for decision. "Whether my conclusions are defensible or not, the basis for them is my
conviction that all the factors are relevant." Id.
34. Greenawalt has specifically rejected the criticism that his approach excludes the
consideration of normative and purposive considerations. See Greenawalt, Fundamental
Questions, supra note 32, at 1147 & n.32. See, for example, Professor Greenawalt's
persuasive analysis of the argument that the First Amendment requires a more absolute
priest-penitent privilege than may be constitutionally acceptable with respect to other
confidential disclosures, Free Exercise and Fairness, supra note 11, at 246-60, and his
sensitive discussion of the Supreme Court's decision in Board of Education of KiryasJoel v.
Grumet. 512 U.S. 687, 690 (1994) (holding state violated Establishment Clause by creating
special school district defined geographically but designed to confer governmental power
on a religious community). See Greenawalt, Establishment and Fairness, supra 26, at 224-
236 (concluding decision was correct). I agree with him on the privilege issue and am not
persuaded by his, or the Justices', arguments about KiryasJoe4 one of the great pleasures of
reading Greenawalt's work is that his invariably fair-minded presentation of the issues and
arguments actually enables the unpersuaded reader to identify the source of his or her dis-
agreement.
35. On the former rationale, see Professor Tribe's apologia for abandoning work on
the third edition of his treatise, Laurence H. Tribe, The Treatise Power, 8 Green Bag 2d
291 (2005). The decline in prestige of the doctrinal treatise generally is a commonplace.
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issues that make up the law, and his goal of providing a rationale, in the
most persuasive manner possible, of the positive legal authorities.36 This
is work in the classical common law tradition: As Coke put it, "'[t]he
reporting of particular cases or examples.., is the most perspicuous
course of tracing the right rule and reason of the law' .. .. Law is prac-
tice, not a theoretical representation of it. ' 37 Rather than substituting
"theory" or "empirical research" for work within the law as a practice, as
so much "cutting-edge" scholarship seeks to do, Greenawalt has
embraced it, confident that legal thought provides an adequate tool for
bringing reason to bear on the political and social issues raised by
religion.
Only a bold scholar would dare to be so unfashionable, but
Professor Greenawalt's recent work doubles down on the commitment to
the law as reason underpinning his treatise on the religion clauses. I do
not have time to indicate how that same commitment is at work in his
important book on legal reasoning and statutory construction, 8 and I
have only had the chance to read in manuscript his fascinating, forth-
coming general treatment of constitutional decisionmaking. But like
many others who have benefited from Greenawalt's wise counsel, I can
testify to another sense in which Greenawalt is unfashionably rooted in
legal tradition. The old common lawyers thought of themselves as exer-
cising a form of "reasoning ... decisively shaped by the fact that it [was]
designed to be presented in a public forum in which the reasoning is
open to explicit challenge."39 Rather than relying on a system of author-
itarian pronouncements based on incontestable premises, "the practi-
tioner of this art of reasoning [was to] strive for common judgment in
the face of dispute and disagreement."' Legal thought, in other words,
was a common, shared activity, and the goal of argument was under-
standing and, where possible, agreement. No doubt this was an ideal
often honored in the breach. But for Kent Greenawalt, practitioner of
the arts of charitable interpretation and painstaking attention to the
work of others, the ideal is a reality that he embodies, in his work and in
his person.
36. See Greenawalt, Establishment and Fairness, supra note 26, at 543 (describing
"burden" of treatise as one of inquiring into "just how the religion clauses ... should best
be understood" by "[a]sking questions about that understanding, not in the abstract but
by focusing on concrete issues in context").
37. Gerald J. Postema, Classical Common Law Jurisprudence (Part II), 3 Oxford
Univ. Commonwealth L.J. 1, 6 (2003) (quoting volume 6 of Coke's Reports).
38. Kent Greenawalt, Statutory and Common Law Interpretation (2012).
39. Postema, supra note 37, at 8.
40. Id.
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RIGOROUS REFLECTION FUELED BY LOVE: KENT
GREENAWALT'S GIFTS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS
Susan P Sturm*
Over the years, I have gotten to know Kent Greenawalt as a corridor-
mate and colleague. We chat frequently, often briefly, as he passes my
door to and from his office three doors down from mine. Those conver-
sations, though seemingly quotidian, have become quite meaningful to
me. They often involve some aspect of our well-being, and have inter-
woven throughout an unspoken but palpable spirit of mutual respect and
appreciation for the significance of many dimensions of our lives, partic-
ularly our families, our weekends, and our rhythms of work. Those rou-
tine interactions have built an almost taken-for-granted yet strong con-
nection, one I deeply value.
I also have come to know Kent through his consistent and thought-
ful participation in faculty workshops. Kent reads papers with both an
appreciative and critical eye. He often refers to a page in the draft that
contains a crucial but underdeveloped point, and poses a question that is
brilliant in its simplicity, and that sits at the vital intersection of the
strength and the weakness of the paper. He does not let anyone off the
hook, in a way that pushes you to be clear about what you mean, as well
as what meaning there is in what you say. He manages to marry tough-
mindedness with deep appreciation and humanity. I, like many of my col-
leagues, listen with anticipation to Kent's fierce yet gentle comments that
have done so much to build a vibrant intellectual community at
Columbia Law School.
I myself was a grateful recipient of Kent's generous and thoughtful
feedback on a paper I presented at a faculty workshop. That paper, tenta-
tively titled Diversity and Beyond, surfaced yet another point of connection
with Kent-a shared concern with how to address race in higher
education. Kent's 1975 article entitled Judicial Scrutiny of "Benign" Racial
Preference in Law School Admissions,' was quoted by the Supreme Court in
Fisher v. University of TexasY Kent was prescient in his concern about the
hazards of pushing underground the racial discourse necessary to ad-
dress enduring racial inequality, and the critical role of the Supreme
Court in creating an environment that will make difficult issues discus-
sable. He ends his article with a plea for the Court to frame its jurispru-
dence with this value at the core:
* George M. Jaffin Professor of Law and Social Responsibility, Columbia Law
School.
1. Kent Greenawalt, Judicial Scrutiny of "Benign" Racial Preference in Law School
Admissions, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 559 (1975) [hereinafter Greenawalt, Racial Preference].
2. 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2420 (2013).
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[W] hatever pain honest and open analysis may cause may be
less serious than the dangers of further covertness and delusion.
Honest judicial confrontation with difficult legal issues is not
always the best policy, but it almost always is; in the absence of an
unanswerable argument for hypocrisy, the Court should pro-
ceed in this area, as in others, on the assumption that open
evaluation of conflicting claims is its responsibility.
3
Through these interactions, I have seen that Kent brings an unusual level
of decency, dignity, and depth to everyday interaction as well as to the
scholarly enterprise.
Given my deep respect for him as a person and a scholar, I seized on
the opportunity to reflect on Kent's life and work as part of Columbia Law
Review's tribute to Professor Greenawalt's fifty years at Columbia. I
wanted to be able to convey the interconnectedness of Kent's deep com-
mitments to human values and family and his laser-like intellect. I asked
Kent to provide some more context about his relationships with family
and students. In response to my questions, Kent decided to share with
me a manuscript entitled "Recollections of Sanja (July 7, 1939-
November 3, 1988)."' Kent began writing this manuscript about his late
wife less than a month after she died, and finished it the following sum-
mer. He wrote it for "future members" of his family, about "things I
would want to tell children-in-law and grandchildren. '5 Its aim was to
serve as "some hedge for those of us graced by Sanja's love against the
erosion of our memories."6
By bestowing on me the honor of sharing this deeply personal man-
uscript, Kent turned my writing of this Tribute into a labor of love. I had
the opportunity to get to know Sanja through Kent's eyes, and in the
process to know Kent on a newer and deeper level. I got to see up close
how Kent used his capacity to write clearly and honestly, with deep sensi-
tivity, erudition, and rigor animated by a commitment to relationships, to
give an invaluable gift to his family. He used language, memory, and nar-
rative to build a relationship across generations with a person who was a
great love in his life.
It is powerful to have read this manuscript from the point of view of
his intended audience-his children and their children. Through this
lens, I learned much about Kent as a person, a thinker, a writer, and a
man. The manuscript is living proof of Kent's effort to use the power of
words to build relationships and learn from the experiences and insights
of others. I also saw concretely in the writing of this deeply personal
reflection the qualities that I so admire in Kent's more professional
writing and interaction.
3. Greenawalt, Racial Preference, supra note 1, at 602.
4. Kent Greenawalt, Recollections of Sanja 1 (July 7, 1939-November 3, 1988)





From the very first page of the manuscript, I imagined Kent in con-
versation with future generations about Sanja, using her words and sto-
ries wherever possible. Indeed, the reflection was launched as the result
of an interaction between Kent and one of his sons the night after Sanja's
death. His son expressed sadness that his children would not know Sanja
personally. Kent undertook to do what he could to fill that gap by writing.
I can imagine Kent asking himself the question, what would Sanja's
and my grandchildren want to know? What is important that they know?
How can I do justice to a person whose deepest values were about how
she made other people feel? The range of topics-family, history, rela-
tionships, sports, religion, food, dress, conflict, friendship, work, cul-
ture-provides life lessons in how to navigate the big and small chal-
lenges and transitions life puts in your path. Kent combines details-
where her parents were born and grew up and where she herself grew up
(mainly the coastal city of Opatija; family composition across the gener-
ations) with important turning points and junctures (sources of conflict,
marriage, giving birth, family illnesses, and building new relationships).
His stories relate to the kinds of things you wished you knew about your
family and the things that you are likely to pass on to the next generation
whether you want to or not. He also shows how language and history
figured so prominently in Sanja's circumstances and choices.
The stories Kent tells are rooted in history, but also set up to convey
symbols of Sanja's life, stories that exemplify the essence of who Sanja
was. "The main sport of Sanya's life was skiing, and one could in a way
chart the stages of her life by her skiing memories and experiences."
7
Kent also tells a story about Sanja as a toddler in 1941 during the war,
when her family was interned along with those of other diplomats.
[Sanja] crossed a forbidden boundary line and embraced a
German boy, leading a famous Yugoslav poet, Ivo Andric, who
was also an [interned] diplomat, to write of how much better
the world would be if adults could follow her example. I have
come to think of this incident as a kind of symbol of Sanja's life;
she always reached out to others warmly and positively and with-
out design or ulterior objectives.8
Kent's narrative speaks to people at different stages of life: child-
hood, adolescence, contemplating marriage, having children, dealing
with building a new extended family, illness, crisis, and death. He grap-
ples openly and honestly with hard questions, and does not sugar-coat
the difficulties that inevitably have to be faced, even in moments often
imagined to be only joyful. His stories provide insight into some of the
biggest challenges and obstacles to forming the relationship that became
so central to his happiness and identity. He also provides names of
people, places, restaurants, and events that figured prominently along
7. Id. at 103.
8. Id. at 4.
[Vol. 115:800
A TRIBUTE TO PROFESSOR GREENAWALT
the way, dropping breadcrumbs that future generations could use as
sources of further insight and experience. Kent's narrative also keeps his-
torical memory alive-what it was like during the war, how history and
politics concretely affected the family's economic situation.
Kent is very open in the manuscript about his own biases and pre-
conceptions about relationships, gender, family, and culture, and how
they affected his interactions. He identifies sources of conflict that are
simultaneously the fuel of learning and connection. He humanizes him-
self-as well as those he cares so deeply about-for his children and
grandchildren, by revealing his own vulnerabilities and foibles, and most
importantly, how he learned and grew in his own relationship with Sanja.
His willingness to reflect openly about himself invites the reader to follow
suit.
Kent's methodology in pulling together and telling Sanja's story
embodies his commitment to transparency and intellectual integrity. The
manuscript is scrupulously accountable and frank about the possibility
that Kent's relationship with Sanja will "lovingly bias" his telling of her
story.9 In Kent's words, he is continually "mixing roughly temporal ac-
counts of past events with subjects of continuing significance in our lives,
incidents in our lives, and my own feelings." 10 He is ever-conscious of how
"these feelings deeply color all I say."" He invites others to critically
engage with his telling of the story.12 The manuscript has an extraor-
dinary combination of rigor, attention to detail, dispassion, and deep
emotion. This level of transparency and rigor of method, here applied to
be persuasive to his future family members, is also evident in the way he
approaches texts in his scholarly work.
Above all, the manuscript makes so clear the importance of relation-
ships in our struggle to make meaning of our lives. He conveys such a
strong sense of the simplicity and depth of love, how it enriches our lives,
and how love transforms us and enables us to be our best selves. The dis-
passionate and straightforward style of the manuscript, even as it is full of
emotion, makes its commitment to values and relationships all the more
accessible.
The audiences for Kent's manuscript could not be more different
from those he seeks to reach with his scholarship. Yet, the common
threads define so powerfully Kent's character, humanity, and impact. I
am struck by Kent's willingness to put into practice the value of enduring
the "pain" of "honest and open analysis" he calls upon the Supreme
Court to uphold, albeit in a different context where relationships of trust
have to be cultivated.' 3 Kent undertook a self-imposed process of rig-
9. Id. at 2.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 114.
13. Greenawalt, Racial Preference, supra note 1, at 602.
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orous reflection, transparency, honesty, and integrity in dialogue with the
people who are most important to him. I, like so many others including
students and colleagues, so deeply value and benefit from the presence
and contributions that flow from Kent's extraordinary combination of
rigor and humanity.
MY FRIEND, THE PHILOSOPHER
William F Young*
I write first of Professor Greenawalt, the scholar, and then of Kent,
the man. I know the scholarship best through the books, Free Exercise and
Fairness and Establishment and Fairness, together making up Religion and
the Constitution.'
Some confessions are in order. First, I do not profess to be impartial;
over the decades of our acquaintance Kent has conferred many kind-
nesses on me. I confess further to having thought that, in this country
and this century, antidisestablishmentarianism is about as fierce a foe as
Ozymandias.2 I have been disabused of that error, however. In our
culture, "scholars, lawyers, and laypersons ask themselves from time to
time just how the religion clauses of our Constitution should best be
understood. 3
Greenawalt's answer incorporates both grace notes4 and a swelling
diapason of political philosophy. It brings to mind this passage from a
notable critic of literature:
[T]he best way to promote profitable discussion is to be as clear
as possible with oneself about what one sees and judges, to try
and establish the essential discriminations in the given field of
interest, and to state them as clearly as one can (for disagree-
ment if necessary).'
That describes what, at the least, Greenawalt has accomplished. Whether
deliberately or not, he reveals a dichotomy in the mind of Chief Justice
Burger about the meaning of "religion." In Wisconsin v. Yoder, Burger
* James L. Dohr Professor Emeritus of Law, Columbia Law School.
1. 2 Kent Greenawalt, Religion and the Constitution: Establishment and Fairness
(2008) [hereinafter Greenawalt, Establishment and Fairness]; 1 Kent Greenawalt, Religion
and the Constitution: Free Exercise and Fairness (2006) [hereinafter Greenawalt, Free
Exercise and Fairness].
2. Ramesses II, of the Nineteenth Dynasty of Egypt, as figured in sonnets by Percy
Bysshe Shelley and Horace Smith. Using poetic license, the authors depicted his broken
statue as a symbol of departed grandeur. See Percy Bysshe Shelley, Ozymandias,
Examiner (London), Jan. 11, 1818, at 24; Horace Smith, Ozymandias, Examiner
(London), Feb. 1, 1818, at 73.
3. Greenawalt, Establishment and Fairness, supra note 1, at 543.
4. A captivating one has to do with the injuries inflicted on a religion by its establish-
ment. As to that, Greenawalt refers to the intrigue in Anthony Trollope's Barchester Towers,
which depicts a change in government's potential influence in clerical appointments, and
a son's efforts to succeed his own dying father as bishop, despite political headwinds.
Greenawalt, Establishment and Fairness, supra note 1, at 5 n. 11. Compare the obsequious
Mr. Collins and his patroness, Lady Catherine de Bourgh, in Pride and Prejudice. See Jane
Austen, Pride and Prejudice 65-69 (Penguin Classics 2006) (1813).
5. F.R. Leavis, The Great Tradition: A Study of the English Novel 9 (Doubleday
1954) (1948).
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spoke of Thoreau's retreat to Walden Pond as a choice "philosophical
and personal."6 A later opinion dealt with a free exercise claim by one
Eddie Thomas.7 According to Burger, Thomas's convictions were not the
less religious because they were imperfectly articulated. One is left with
the suspicion that in Burger's view-a curiously Marxist one-what is
religion for the unlettered is philosophy for the enlightened.
And yet, one wishes for more. Regrettably, Establishment and Fairness
went to press before the opinions of the justices in Town of Greece v.
Galloway were released.8 (On the other hand, Greenawalt is prescient;
there is evidence that he anticipated something like the majority conclu-
sion. 9 ) One may wish for a discussion of Bronson Alcott's Fruit-
lands-part government, part religion.10 And a reference to Anne
Hutchinson's banishment from Boston." (What of the hypothetical case,
Hutchinson v. Boston Church?)
Finally, some remarks about Kent's personal qualities. As to those,
some things are evident from Religion and the Constitution: His habit is to
take full account of views differing from his own and to treat them with
respect. 2 He does not, as a rule, indulge in a put-down. I know of one
instance only of a sharp retort by Kent. 3 Laying the books aside, my per-
6. 406 U.S. 205, 216 (1972) (contrasting religious claims of Amish petitioners with
"philosophical and personal" reasons for Thoreau's seclusion at Walden Pond).
7. That claim had been rejected by the Supreme Court of Indiana, in an opinion
that picked up the remark about Thoreau. According to that court, Thomas was "unclear
[about] what his belief was, and what the religious basis of his belief was," adding, "The
precise belief is not articulated." Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp't Sec. Div., 391 N.E.2d
1127, 1133 (Ind. 1979). On review, the Supreme Court set that right in Thomas v. Review
Bd. of Ind. Emp't Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
8. 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014). There the majority pronounced a benison on public
prayers at town board meetings. See id. at 1821-23.
9. See Greenawalt, Establishment and Fairness, supra note 1, at 86 (anticipating
certain views of ChiefJustice Roberts and Justice Alito that would produce the exact group
of five who voted together-largely-in Town of Greece).
10. Bronson Alcott, an educator and writer, founded Fruitlands, a community ded-
icated to transcendental ideals, in Massachusetts in 1843. According to Alcott's daughter,
Louisa May, this endeavor was wholly feckless. See Louisa M. Alcott, Transcendental Wild
Oats 1569.
11. Anne Hutchinson was a dissident religious leader banished from the
Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1638. For a survey of Hutchinson's life, including her trial,
banishment, and excommunication, see generally Edith Roelker Curtis, Anne Hutchinson:
A Biography (1930).
12. For a notable example, see Greenawalt, Free Exercise and Fairness, supra note 1,
at 375-76 (articulating rationale for strict approach to protection of workplace religious
speech, in which otherwise protected expression can never "cumulate into violations of
Title VII").
13. I know of that from Free Exercise and Fairness, supra note 1, at 96. There
Greenawalt reports having heard from a conference speaker that a citizen cannot be a
good Christian if he doesn't know the names of his representatives in four legislative
bodies. Greenawalt responded by inquiring howJesus would have fared had he been given
an analogous test. That, in my book, is Acerbity vs. Absurdity. Something softer would have
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ception of the man is so unlikely to be objective that I confine myself to
an observation about his dealings with colleagues and students. He en-
gages with them seriously-often charitably-and never aggressively.
What one sees, commonly, when he notices that an argument being pur-
sued by one or another is headed for a smash-up, is a sparkle in Kent's
eyes and a hint of a smile on his face. For anyone who knows him well,
that is reproof enough.
been more in character. I suggest the observation, say, that redistricting might lead to
widespread excommunications.
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